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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2013, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit to 
explicitly reject an employer’s contention that an employment 
discrimination lawsuit should be dismissed because the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) failed to engage in 
out-of-court negotiation efforts with the employer before filing suit.
1
 
In EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, the Seventh Circuit addressed the 
provision contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that 
requires the EEOC to satisfy certain conditions before it can file a 
discrimination lawsuit against an employer.
2
 One of these conditions is 
that the EEOC must engage in “informal methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion.”3 The purpose of these pre-suit 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., History and Legal Studies, Northwestern University. I would like 
to thank my professor, Hal Morris. I would also like to thank my family, especially 
my parents, Robert and Rose DeLeon, for all of their support. 
1
 EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 172–73 (7th Cir. 2013).   
2
 Id.  
3
 Id. at 175. 
1
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negotiations, or “conciliation,” is to provide an opportunity for the 
EEOC to reach an out-of-court agreement with an employer to end the 
employer’s discriminatory practices without seeking a judicial 
remedy.
4
 The court held, however, that an employer’s claim that the 
EEOC failed to engage in conciliation is “not an affirmative defense to 
the merits of an employment discrimination suit.”5 That is, the 
EEOC’s alleged failure to comply with Title VII’s conciliation 
requirement is not grounds for dismissal of an employment 
discrimination lawsuit on the merits.
6
 
The crux of the court’s reasoning in Mach is that the EEOC’s 
conciliation process is not—and should not be—judicially 
reviewable.
7
 The court stated that “[i]f the EEOC has pled on the face 
of its complaint that it has complied with all procedures required under 
Title VII and the relevant documents are facially sufficient . . . our 
review of those procedures is satisfied.”8 In rendering this decision, 
the court stressed that the language of Title VII does not authorize 
judicial review of the conciliation process.
9
 Furthermore, the court 
found that there is no meaningful standard by which to evaluate 
conciliation, especially because Title VII’s confidentiality requirement 
prohibits disclosure of the details of the conciliation process in 
subsequent hearings.
10
 As such, it would be impossible for a court to 
make any meaningful determinations regarding the EEOC’s 
conciliation efforts because the court would not have access to 
relevant information regarding what happened during the conciliation 
process.
11
 The Mach court also asserts that Title VII contraindicates 
judicial review of conciliation because it grants the EEOC absolute 
discretion in deciding whether to accept an employer’s offer of 
                                                 
4
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (2009). 
5
 Mach, 738 F.3d at 172.  
6
 Id. 
7
 Id. at 177.  
8
 Id. at 184. 
9
 Id. at 174–75. 
10
 Id. at 174–76. 
11
Id. 
2
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compliance.
12
 In other words, courts do not have the authority to 
determine the sufficiency of the conciliation process because Title VII 
delegates that authority exclusively to the EEOC.
13
 The court also 
noted that, contrary to Mach Mining’s contention, the EEOC’s alleged 
failure-to-conciliate was not grounds for dismissal on the merits 
because “letting one party off the hook entirely” would be “too final 
and drastic a remedy for any procedural deficiency in conciliation.”14 
Thus, the Mach court held that courts may not conduct any 
investigation whatsoever into the adequacy of the EEOC’s conciliation 
efforts.
15
 Indeed, the court even refused to recognize, as other circuits 
have, an implied “good faith” requirement in the EEOC’s conciliation 
efforts.
16
 The court stated that it is too difficult to enforce a good faith 
obligation upon the EEOC because it would run contrary to the 
EEOC’s unilateral authority to reject even the most generous 
conciliation offers.
17
 Ultimately, the result of the Seventh Circuit’s 
holding is that the EEOC need not engage in extensive or thorough 
conciliation efforts.
18
 In fact, its efforts need not even be made in good 
faith.
19
 So long as the EEOC pleads, in its complaint, that it complied 
with Title VII’s requirements, the court will deem the requirement 
fulfilled.
20
  
At first glance, it seems as though the Seventh Circuit, in its 
sharp divergence with every other circuit that has considered this 
issue, took an extreme approach to interpreting Title VII, and that the 
Mach decision has rendered the conciliation requirement utterly 
toothless. Upon closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that 
the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the conciliation requirement is 
fully consistent with the text and purpose of Title VII. As the court 
noted, Title VII gives the EEOC full discretion in defining and 
                                                 
12
Id. at 175. 
13
 Id. 
14
 Id. at 184.  
15
 Id. at 184. 
16
 Id. at 182–83.  
17
 Id. 
18
 See id. at 184. 
19
 Id. at 176–77. 
20
 Id. at 184.  
3
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executing the conciliation process and effectively ensures that the 
conciliation process is insulated from judicial scrutiny by guaranteeing 
that the substance of the process remain confidential.
21
 Furthermore, 
as the Supreme Court noted in Occidental Life Insurance of California 
v. EEOC, “the individual’s rights to redress are paramount under the 
provisions of Title VII” and it is therefore ““necessary that all avenues 
be left open for quick and effective relief.”22 With the individual’s 
right to redress in mind, it would be counterintuitive to permanently 
bar an aggrieved employee’s discrimination claim based upon a mere 
procedural deficiency.
23
 Title VII’s conciliation requirement, then, 
does not, and should not, create a hurdle that the EEOC must 
overcome before it can file an employment discrimination lawsuit. 
Rather, the requirement is best characterized as a procedural formality 
that gives the employer an opportunity to avoid litigation by 
voluntarily complying with Title VII’s requirements.24  
The first section of this note provides general background 
information regarding the conciliation requirement and Title VII. The 
second section provides an overview of how other circuits have 
addressed judicial reviewability of conciliation. The third section 
analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Mach Mining and examines 
how the court’s reasoning relates to other Seventh Circuit case law 
involving EEOC litigation. And finally, the fourth section argues that 
that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Mach is supported by the 
statutory text and overall purpose of Title VII.   
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Id. at 173. 
22
 Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 366 (U.S. 1977) (quoting 
118 CONG. REC. 1068-1069 (1972)).  
23
 See Mach, 738 F.3d at 172. 
24
 Id. at 180. Cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 1511, 1521 (2001) 
(“Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected 
create ‘no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons.’”) 
(quoting California v. Sierra Club, 101 S.Ct. 1775 (1981)). 
4
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I. THE CONCILIATION REQUIREMENT AND TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1964 
 
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC 
may bring suit against employers who engage in discriminatory 
employment practices.
25
 Before filing suit, however, the EEOC must 
engage in conciliation efforts with the employer.
 26
 That is, once the 
EEOC has reasonable cause to believe an employer is engaging in 
discriminatory practices, it must try to reach an out-of-court agreement 
with the employer to end such practices.
27
 If the EEOC is unable to 
reach a conciliation agreement that is acceptable to the Commission, 
the Commission may then file an employment discrimination lawsuit 
against the employer.
28
 
Section 2000e-5 of Title VII explains the process by which the 
EEOC handles allegations of employment discrimination and reads, in 
relevant part: 
 
Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person 
claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission, 
alleging that an employer . . . has engaged in an unlawful 
employment practice, the Commission shall serve a notice of 
the charge . . . and shall make an investigation thereof. . . . If 
the Commission determines after such investigation that there 
is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it 
shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person 
claiming to be aggrieved and the respondent of its action 
. . . If the Commission determines after such investigation 
that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is 
true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such 
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods 
of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or 
                                                 
25
 42 U.S.C., § 2000e-5(b); see Note, Judicial Responses to the EEOC’s 
Failure to Attempt Conciliation, 81 MICH. L. REV. 433, 441 (1982). 
26
 42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(b). 
27
 42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(b). 
28
 42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(b). 
5
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done during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be 
made public by the Commission, its officers or employees, or 
used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the 
written consent of the persons concerned. . . . If within thirty 
days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within 
thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under 
subsection (c) or (d) of this section, the Commission has been 
unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation 
agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission 
may bring a civil action against any respondent. . .
29
  
 
Either an aggrieved employee or a member of the Commission may 
file a “charge” of discrimination with the EEOC.30 When the EEOC 
receives such a charge, it must notify the employer of the grievance 
within ten days.
31
 Then, the EEOC must investigate whether 
reasonable cause exists to support the allegation.
32
 If, after 
investigating, the EEOC determines there is not reasonable cause to 
believe that the allegation is true, it must dismiss the charge.
33
 If, 
however, the EEOC determines that reasonable cause exists that the 
allegation is true, the conciliation process is triggered.
34
 The EEOC 
must then “endeavor to eliminate . . . unlawful employment practices 
by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”35 If 
the EEOC is “unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation 
agreement acceptable to the Commission,” the Commission may then 
file a lawsuit against the employer within thirty days after the date that 
the charge was filed.
36
 
                                                 
29
 Id. (emphasis added). 
30
 Id.; see Anthony P. Zana, A Pragmatic Approach to EEOC Misconduct: 
Drawing A Line on Commission Bad Faith in Title VII Litigation, 73 MISS. L.J. 289, 
292–94 (2003). 
31
 Zana, supra note 30.  
32
 42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(b). 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. 
6
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 Additionally, Section 2000e(f)(1) of Title VII provides an 
alternative remedy by which an aggrieved employee can seek relief if 
the employee is dissatisfied with the EEOC’s progress in investigating, 
conciliating, or prosecuting his or her charge.
37
  This section reads, in 
relevant part: 
 
If a charge filed with the Commission . . . is dismissed by the 
Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from 
the filing of such charge[,] . . . the Commission has not filed a 
civil action under this section . . . or the Commission has not 
entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person 
aggrieved is a party, . . . a civil action may be brought against 
the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person 
claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a 
member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge 
alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment 
practice.
38
 
 
That is, a complainant may circumvent the EEOC’s procedures and 
seek relief through a private action in district court.
39
 This private right 
of action, however, does not arise until the employee receives a “right 
to sue” letter from the EEOC, which states that the EEOC does not 
intend to file suit against the employer.
40
 The EEOC is required to 
send this letter within 180 days after the date the charge was filed.
41
 
The Supreme Court examined this provision in Occidental Life 
Insurance of California v. EEOC, wherein the Court held that the 180-
day limitation was not a statute of limitations on EEOC enforcement 
suits, but rather addressed an alternative enforcement procedure.
42
 The 
Court stated that “[t]he retention of the private right of action . . . is 
designed to make sure that the person aggrieved does not have to 
                                                 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2006).  
41
 Stewart v. EEOC, 611 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1979).  
42
 432 U.S. 355, 361 (1977). 
7
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endure lengthy delays if the Commission . . . does not act with due 
diligence and speed.”43 The Court added that this provision “allow[s] 
the person aggrieved to elect to pursue his or her own remedy under 
this title in the courts where there is agency inaction, dalliance or 
dismissal of the charge, or unsatisfactory resolution.”44 
Notably, as originally enacted, Title VII only granted 
individual employees the right to sue an employer for discrimination, 
and the EEOC could only seek voluntary compliance through 
conciliation.
45
 Over time, however, voluntary compliance proved 
elusive, as more than half of the EEOC’s conciliation efforts were 
unsuccessful.
46
 Consequently, Congress enacted the Equal 
Opportunity Act of 1972, which amended Title VII to permit the 
EEOC to sue employers for engaging in discriminatory practices.
47
 
Under the revised Act, the EEOC’s power to sue employers is 
conditioned on its inability to “secure from the respondent a 
conciliation agreement acceptable to the EEOC.”48 In other words, the 
EEOC must make conciliation efforts, and may only sue an employer 
if it is unsatisfied with the results of the conciliation process. Title VII 
also requires that the conciliation process remain confidential, stating 
that  “nothing said or done and as part of such informal endeavors may 
be made public by the Commission, its officers or employers, or used 
as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of 
the person concerned.”49  The statute provides no additional 
information about the requirements of the conciliation process.
50
 
The conciliation process itself has several benefits.
51
  It gives 
the employer an opportunity to explain or justify its conduct before 
                                                 
43
 Id. at 365–66 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 1068–1069 (1972)). 
44
 Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 365. 
45
 Judicial Responses to the EEOC’s Failure to Attempt Conciliation, supra 
note 25, at 441–42. 
46
 EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, 679 F.3d 657, 682 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell Co., 507 F.2d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 1974)). 
47
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); see CRST Van Expedited, 679 F.3d at 682.  
48
 CRST Van Expedited, 679 F.3d at 682.  
49
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 
50
 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 
51
 Note, III. Procedure Under Title VII, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1195, 1200 (1971). 
8
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litigation receives widespread public attention.
52
 Additionally, 
conciliation is generally less expensive and less time consuming than 
litigation.
53
 As the Seventh Circuit noted, the purpose of conciliation 
and other pre-suit requirements is to “encourage the complainant and 
the employer . . .  to resolve their dispute informally.”54 The court also 
noted that informal resolutions aid in “reducing the burden on the 
courts of enforcing Title VII.”55 Despite the theoretical advantages of 
conciliation, however, EEOC conciliation has been less than a 
complete success.
56
 To date, the EEOC has been unable to achieve 
even partially successful conciliation in more than half the cases in 
which it was attempted.
57
  
While conciliation undoubtedly has multiple benefits and is 
clearly a prerequisite to the EEOC’s authority to file a lawsuit against 
an employer, the EEOC is granted great deference in defining the 
parameters and procedures that comprise conciliation. In fact, 
commentators have noted that the EEOC’s conciliation and 
investigation process, “probably require the most discretion by EEOC 
officers and, not coincidentally, are often the most vulnerable for an 
employer to challenge.”58 Indeed, the conciliation process has been the 
subject of much litigation, and circuit courts sharply split on whether, 
and to what extent, the conciliation process is subject to judicial 
review.
59
 The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Mach deepened and 
complicated the circuit split, as explained below.
60
 
 
                                                 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2006).  
55
 Id. at 708–09. 
56
 III. Procedure Under Title VII, supra note 51, at 1200. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Zana, supra note 30, at 292–94.  
59
 See EEOC v. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d 171, 182 (7th Cir. 2013). 
60
 Id. 
9
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II. CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
The Seventh Circuit stands alone in holding that the EEOC’s 
conciliation process is not subject to any level of judicial review.
61
 
Eight circuits have examined this issue, and each held or, at a 
minimum, assumed that the conciliation process is subject to some 
level of judicial review.
62
 Of these eight circuits, six have articulated 
specific standards of review, falling into two camps.
63
 The first camp, 
comprised of the Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, evaluates the 
conciliation process by asking generally whether the EEOC acted 
“reasonably” or in “good faith.”64 The second camp, comprised of the 
Second, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, evaluates the conciliation under a 
more searching three-part inquiry.
65
 This latter standard requires the 
                                                 
61
 Id. 
62
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 
171 (7th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1019), 2014 WL 709677, at *8. 
63
 Id. at 12-19. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have found that the conciliation 
process is judicially reviewable, but neither Circuit has explicitly adopted a precise 
standard by which courts should review the process. See, e.g., EEOC v. CRST Van 
Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 676–77 (8th Cir. 2012) (reviewing the adequacy of 
the EEOC’s conciliation and investigation processes to determine whether the 
EEOC’s case should be dismissed); EEOC v. Trans States Airlines, 462 F.3d 987, 
996 (8th Cir. 2006) (permitting judicial review into the “EEOC’s failure to satisfy its 
obligation to conciliate” to decide whether to award attorney’s fees against the 
EEOC); EEOC v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 288–89 (9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing 
adequacy of conciliation efforts in context of request for attorney’s fee award against 
the agency). 
64
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 62, at 12–13; see, e.g., EEOC v. 
Am. Nat’l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1185–86 (4th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Radiator 
Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 
F.2d 1097, 1101–02 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 532-34 (10th 
Cir. 1978). 
65
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 62, at 18; see, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14, 18–19 (2d Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, 
Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1534-35 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Agro Distribution, LLC, 555 
F.3d 462, 467-69 (5th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 106-
07 (5th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Pet, Ic., Funsten Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001, 1002-03 (5th 
Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1259-61 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
10
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EEOC: 1) to outline to the employer the reasonable cause for its belief 
that Title VII has been violated; 2) to offer an opportunity for 
voluntary compliance; and 3) to respond in a reasonable and flexible 
manner to the reasonable attitudes of the employer.
66
  
These eight circuits allow courts to review the EEOC’s 
conciliation process,
67
 even though Title VII mandates that the details 
of the conciliation process remain confidential.
68
 This begs the 
question: how can a court make a determination regarding any aspect 
of the conciliation process if the court cannot probe into the details of 
that process? The eight circuits that allow for judicial review answer 
this question by drawing a distinction between review of the 
conciliation process, which they permit, and review of the substance of 
the EEOC’s position, which they supposedly prohibit.69 In EEOC v. 
Zia Co., for example, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that “a court 
should not examine the details of the offers and counteroffers between 
the parties, nor impose its notions of what the agreement should 
provide.”70 Nevertheless, the court determined that the EEOC’s 
conciliation process was insufficient because the EEOC refused to re-
open conciliation to resolve a dispute over the proposed conciliation 
agreement.
71
 In Mach, the Seventh Circuit stated that drawing this type 
of distinction between process and substance is “too fine a thread on 
which to hang judicial review”72 because it “slide[s] easily from 
review of the form of conciliation toward more substantive scrutiny.”73 
The Mach court stated that review of the EEOC’s conciliation efforts 
“would almost inevitably find itself engaged in a prohibited inquiry 
into the substantive reasonableness of particular offers, not to mention 
using confidential and inadmissible materials as evidence—unless its 
review were so cursory as to be meaningless.”74  
                                                 
66
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 62, at 18. 
67
 Id. at 13. 
68
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b). 
69
 EEOC v. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d 171, 175 (7th Cir. 2013). 
70
 582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1978). 
71
 Id. at 534. 
72
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 184. 
73
 Id. 
74
 Id. at 177. 
11
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To the extent that circuits have attempted to justify their 
allowance of judicial review of the conciliation process, most have 
pointed generally to Congress's intention that the EEOC address 
discrimination through voluntary settlement.
75
 The Eleventh Circuit, 
for example, has highlighted that Title VII’s conciliation requirement 
“clearly reflects a strong congressional desire for out-of-court 
settlements of Title VII violations.”76 The Eighth Circuit echoed this 
sentiment, reasoning that“[a]lthough the EEOC enjoys wide latitude in 
investigating and filing lawsuits related to charges of discrimination, 
Title VII limits that latitude to some degree by plac[ing] a strong 
emphasis on administrative, rather than judicial, resolution of 
disputes.”77 The Seventh Circuit, however, was unpersuaded by these 
justifications, stating it was “skeptical that court oversight is necessary 
or that it encourages compliance rather than strategic evasion on the 
part of employers.”78 The Seventh Circuit opined that judicial review 
of the conciliation process would not encourage voluntary compliance 
with Title VII.
79
 On the contrary, it would undermine conciliation by 
tempting employers “to turn what was meant to be an informal 
negotiation into the subject of endless disputes over whether the 
EEOC did enough before going to court.”80 The court also pointed out 
that, even without judicial review, the conciliation process is subject to 
meaningful scrutiny.
81
 Namely, Congress can exert its influence on the 
EEOC through oversight hearings, adjustments to appropriations, and 
statutory amendments.
82
  
                                                 
75
 Id. at 183. 
76
 EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(citing Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir.1970)). 
77
 EEOC. v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 674 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(internal quotations omitted) (citing U.S. Equal Opportunity Comm'n v. Dillard's 
Inc., No. 08–CV–1780–IEG (PCL), 2011 WL 2784516, slip op. at *5 (S.D. Cal. July 
14, 2011)). 
78
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 183. 
79
 Id. at 178–79. 
80
 Id.  
81
 Id. at 180. 
82
 Id.  
12
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 7
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol9/iss2/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 9, Issue 2                         Spring 2014 
 
382 
 
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the “good 
faith” requirement imposed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits.83 
In Mach, the defendant-employer argued that the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) offers a template for how courts should analyze 
good faith in this context.
84
 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument 
because, unlike the NLRA, Title VII does not contain an explicit 
statutory command to employers and unions to negotiate in good 
faith.
85
 Further, the Mach court stated that it is “difficult . . . to enforce 
such a duty, because it jostles uneasily with the right of each party to a 
labor negotiation to refuse an offer by the other even if a neutral 
observer would think it a fair, or even a generous offer.”86 
Additionally, in Mach, the EEOC cited to the Congressional 
record in both its appellate brief and its motion for certification to 
support its argument that a “good faith” requirement is inconsistent 
with the language and intent of Title VII.
87
 In both its brief and 
motion, the EEOC highlighted that a majority of senators who 
considered the matter disfavored judicial review of conciliation.
88
 
Senator Samuel Ervin, for example, found such a suggestion to be 
“inconceivable,” stating “I do not know . . . how a court could probe 
into the minds of the Commission [to determine] whether they did or 
did not, in good faith, decide that they would or would not work out a 
conciliation agreement.”89 Senator Jacob Javits added that allowing 
                                                 
83
 Id. at 176 
84
 Id. 
85
 Id. 
86
 Id. at 176 (citing Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 711 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
87
 Brief of Appellant at 11–17, EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (No. 13-2456); Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Reconsider or to Certify 
Under 1292(b) at 10–11, EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171 (No. 11–cv–
00879–JPG–PMF). 
88
 Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 13–16; Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to 
Reconsider or to Certify Under 1292(b), supra note 87, at 10–11.  
89
 Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 11. (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 3807 (Feb. 
14, 1972)); Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Reconsider or to Certify Under 1292(b), 
supra note 87, at 10. (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 3807 (Feb. 14, 1972)). 
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judicial review would “introduce a totally different standard than 
anything encompassed by our laws or practice.”90  
By rejecting the “good faith” requirement, and refusing to 
subject conciliation to any level of judicial scrutiny, the Mach court 
sharply disagreed with its sister circuits. The court’s reasoning for this 
divergence is reviewed and analyzed below. 
 
III. EEOC V. MACH MINING, LLC. 
 
In E.E.O.C. v. Mach Mining, an employer-defendant sought 
dismissal of a discrimination suit on the grounds that the EEOC failed 
to comply with Title VII’s requirements.91 Namely, the employer 
alleged that the EEOC failed to engage in good faith conciliation 
before filing suit.
92
 The court held, however, that failure-to-conciliate 
was not grounds for dismissal on the merits because the conciliation 
process is not subject to judicial review.
93
 This decision is consistent 
with the Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to allow courts to review and 
evaluate the adequacy of the EEOC’s pre-suit processes.94 In Mach, 
the court defended its reasoning, stating that it was “consistent with 
our earlier cases rejecting similar attempts by employers to change the 
                                                 
90
 Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 11. (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 3807 (Feb. 
14, 1972)); Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Reconsider or to Certify Under 1292(b), 
supra note 87 at 10. (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 3807 (Feb. 14, 1972)) 
91
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 171.   
92
 Id. 
93
 Id. at 171–72. 
94
 See Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 2006) (refusing to 
review whether an employee cooperated during pre-suit proceedings); EEOC v. 
Caterpillar, Inc. 409 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2005) (the “existence of probable cause 
to sue is generally and in this instance not judicially reviewable.”); EEOC v. Elgin 
Teachers Assoc., 27 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that the decision to file 
suit is within the sole discretion of the EEOC “rather than the judiciary); McCottrell 
v. EEOC, 726 F.2d 350, 351 (7th Cir. 1984) (refusing to review the EEOC’s “no 
reasonable cause” determination); Stewart v. EEOC, 611 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 
1979) (refusing to review the adequacy or timeliness of the EEOC’s pre-suit 
investigation and “reasonable cause” determination).  
14
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focus from their employment practices to the agency’s pre-suit 
processes.”95 
 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
 
In early 2008, the EEOC received a charge of discrimination from 
a woman who claimed Mach Mining did not hire a number of coal 
miner applicants based on gender.
96
 The EEOC investigated the charge 
and determined that there was reasonable cause to believe Mach 
Mining had, in fact, discriminated against a class of female job 
applicants at its mine near Johnston City, Illinois.
97
 According to the 
EEOC, Mach Mining had never hired a single female for a mining-
related position and did not even have a women’s bathroom at its 
mining site.
98
  In late 2010, the EEOC notified Mach Mining of its 
intent to begin formal conciliation efforts.
99
 The parties discussed 
possible resolutions, but ultimately, the EEOC and Mach Mining did 
not reach a conciliation agreement.
100
 
In September 2011, the EEOC informed Mach Mining that the 
conciliation process was unsuccessful and that further conciliation 
efforts would be futile.
101
 Two weeks later, the EEOC filed its 
complaint against Mach Mining.
102
 The complaint alleged that Mach 
Mining violated Title VII by engaging in a pattern or practice of 
unlawful employment practices since at least January 1, 2006.
103
 The 
                                                 
95
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 181. 
96
 Id. at 173. 
97
 Id. 
98
 EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11–cv–879–JPG–PMF, 2013 WL 319337, 
at *1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013), rev’d, 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013); EEOC v. Mach 
Mining, LLC, No. 11-CV-879-JPG-PMF, 2013 WL 2177770 at *1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 
2013). 
99
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 173. 
100
 Id. 
101
 Id. 
102
 Id. 
103
 EEOC v. Mach Mining, No. 11–cv–879–JPG–PMF, 2013 WL 319337 (S.D. 
Ill. Dec. 20, 2013); EEOC v. Mach Mining, No. 11-cv-879-JPG-PMF, 2013 WL 
2177770, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013).  
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complaint also stated that the action was “authorized and instituted 
pursuant to Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) and 707 of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended.”104 
Mach Mining’s answer to the complaint denied unlawful 
discrimination and asserted several affirmative defenses, one of which 
claimed that the suit should be dismissed because the EEOC failed to 
conciliate in good faith.
105
 The EEOC moved for summary judgment 
solely on the issue of whether, as a matter of law, an alleged failure to 
conciliate is a valid affirmative defense to an employment 
discrimination suit. 
106
 The EEOC’s motion did not address the 
sufficiency of its conciliation efforts – rather, the EEOC only argued 
that Title VII did not authorize judicial review of the EEOC’s 
conciliation efforts.
107
 
The district court denied the EEOC’s motion, holding that 
courts should evaluate conciliation to the extent needed to “determine 
whether the EEOC made ‘a sincere and reasonable effort to 
negotiate.’”108 The EEOC then filed a Motion to Reconsider or Certify 
for immediate appellate review.
109
 In its motion, the EEOC 
characterized Mach Mining’s failure-to-conciliate defense as “an 
attempt to whittle away the class of women for whom the EEOC may 
obtain relief” for unlawful employment practices.110 Although the 
district court denied the EEOC’s Motion to Reconsider, it granted the 
EEOC’s Motion to Certify because the EEOC established the four 
                                                 
104
 Complaint at 1, EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d at 171 (No. 11–cv–
879–JPG–PM). 
105
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 173. 
106
 EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11–cv–879–JPG–PMF, 2013 WL 319337 
(S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013); EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11-CV-879-JPG-PMF, 
2013 WL 2177770, at *2. 
107
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 173. 
108
 EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11-cv-879-JPG-PMF, 2013 WL 319337, 
at *5 (S.D. Ill, Jan. 28, 2013) (quoting EEOC v. Menard, Inc., No. 08–cv–0655–
DRH, 2009 WL 1708628, at *1 (S.D. Ill. June 17, 2009)). 
109
 EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11-CV-879-JPG-PMF, 2013 WL 
2177770, at *1. 
110
 Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Reconsider or to Certify Under 1292(b), supra 
note 87, at 1. 
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statutory criteria
111
 for certification.
112
 Accordingly, the court certified 
the following questions for immediate appellate review: whether 
courts may review the EEOC’s informal efforts to secure a 
conciliation agreement acceptable to the EEOC before filing suit? If 
courts may review the EEOC’s conciliation efforts, should the 
reviewing court apply a deferential or heightened scrutiny standard of 
review?
113
 
The Seventh Circuit issued its opinion on December 20, 2013, 
holding that conciliation is not subject to any level of judicial review, 
and thus failure-to-conciliate is not a valid affirmative defense to the 
EEOC’s unlawful employment discrimination suit.114 The Seventh 
Circuit’s reasoning is explained and analyzed below. 
  On February 25, 2014, Mach Mining filed a Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari for the Seventh Circuit’s decision to be reviewed by the 
United States Supreme Court.
115
  
 
B. The Language of Title VII Does Not Authorize Judicial Review of 
the Conciliation Process 
 
The Mach court stressed that Title VII contains no express 
provisions for judicial review of the EEOC’s conciliation process and 
does not provide for an affirmative defense based on an alleged defect 
in the EEOC’s conciliation efforts.116 Highlighting the “precise, 
                                                 
111
 There are four statutory criteria for the grant of a section 1292(b): there must 
be a question of law, it must be controlling, it must be contestable, and its resolution 
must promise to speed up the litigation. Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 219 
F.3d 674, 676 (7th Cir. 2000). 
112
 EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11–cv–879–JPG–PMF, 2013 WL 319337 
(S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013); EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, (No. 11-CV-879-JPG-PMF), 
2013 WL 2177770, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013). 
113
 EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, (No. 11-CV-879-JPG-PMF), 2013 WL 
2177770, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013). 
114
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 184. 
115
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 62.  
116
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 174.  
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complex, and exhaustive nature”117 of Title VII, the court stated “this 
silence itself is compelling.”118 In the absence of an express 
authorization for judicial review, the court refused to read an implied 
authorization into Title VII because it is “incorrect to infer that 
Congress meant anything than what the text does say.”119 The EEOC 
also highlights this silence in its appellate brief, pointing out:  
 
No provision specifically articulates what the EEOC must do 
besides attempt conciliation and decide whether the employer 
offered a conciliation agreement acceptable to the 
Commission. No provision authorizes judicial review of that 
decision. No provision declares what venue would hear 
challenges based on alleged failures to conciliate. No 
provision establishes what standard of review would apply in 
assessing the validity of that decision. And no provision 
articulates what the remedy should be if the EEOC fails to 
fulfill its duty to engage in conciliation.
120
 
 
Because the EEOC neither expressly authorizes judicial review, nor 
provides guidance as to how the conciliation process should be 
reviewed, the court infers Congress did not intend conciliation to be 
reviewable. Rather, the court need only verify whether the EEOC 
pleaded on the face of its complaint that it complied with Title VII’s 
requirements.
121
  
The EEOC also argued that Title VII’s failure to require a 
formalized record of the conciliation process is further evidence that 
Congress did not intend to authorize judicial review of conciliation.
122
 
                                                 
117
 Id. (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2530, 
(2013)). 
118
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 174. 
119
 Id. 
120
 Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 7–8 
121
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 184. 
122
 Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 10.; see ICC v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 
482 U.S. 270, 283-84 (1987) (rejecting judicial review of denials of reconsideration 
because of the lack of consistent recordkeeping, reasoning that review was not 
18
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The EEOC used the Congressional record to support this argument, 
noting that Senator Williams voiced concern that review of 
conciliation would be problematic because there would be no record of 
the informal conferences, phone calls, and meetings.
123
 Thus, courts 
would be forced to review an incomplete record that does not 
accurately represent what occurred.
124
 This reasoning is consistent 
with the Seventh Circuit’s previous refusals to review the adequacy of 
the EEOC’s statutorily-required pre-suit actions, especially when 
statutory text is contraindicative of such review.
125
 
 
1. Stewart v. EEOC 
 
In Stewart v. EEOC, several employees sought review of the 
EEOC’s alleged failure to make timely reasonable cause 
determinations of their charges.
126
 The employees claimed that the 
EEOC failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of Title VII by 
neglecting their charges of employment discrimination by allowing the 
charges to remain “uninvestigated, unprocessed, and without 
reasonable cause determinations for one to more than two years.”127 
The Seventh Circuit, however, refused to probe into the EEOC’s pre-
suit procedures, reasoning that Title VII does not authorize review of 
the challenged agency actions by the EEOC.
128
  The Court relied 
heavily on the language of Title VII, stating that “[h]ad Congress 
intended a remedy of enforcement against the EEOC, the provisions of 
                                                                                                                   
workable because “the vast majority of denials of reconsideration . . . are made 
without a statement of reasons”). 
123
 118 Cong. Rec. 3806 (Feb. 14, 1972). 
124
 Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 10. 
125
 See EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 181 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[The 
Seventh Circuit’s] rejection of the [failure-to-conciliate] defense is consistent with 
[the Seventh Circuit’s] earlier cases rejecting similar attempts by employers to 
change the focus from their employment practices to the agency's pre-suit 
processes.”) 
126
 Stewart v. EEOC, 611 F.2d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 1979). 
127
 Id. at 681.  
128
 Id.  
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[Title VII] would have so indicated.”129 This reasoning is consistent 
with the court’s reasoning in Mach. In both cases, the Seventh Circuit 
adhered to the plain text of Title VII and refused to read an implied 
remedy into the statute.
130
 
 
2. McCottrell v. EEOC 
 
In McCottrell v. EEOC, the Seventh Circuit refused to review 
the EEOC’s finding that there was no reasonable cause to believe that 
an employee’s discrimination charge was true.131 After the EEOC 
made its “no reasonable cause” determination, the employee filed suit 
against his employer and eventually reached a settlement.
132
 The 
employee then sued the EEOC, arguing that the settlement was 
evidence that the EEOC’s “no reasonable cause” determination was 
erroneous.
133
 The Seventh Circuit, however, refused to review the 
EEOC’s finding, holding that “Title VII does not provide either an 
express or implied cause of action against the EEOC to challenge its 
investigation and processing of a charge.”134 This reasoning illustrates 
the Seventh Circuit’s continued refusal to allow for judicial review of 
the EEOC’s pre-suit processes where Title VII does not expressly 
allow for such review. 
 
3. Doe v. Oberweis Dairy 
 
In Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, twenty-seven years after 
McCottrell, the Seventh Circuit rejected a defendant-employer’s 
argument that an employee’s failure to cooperate with the EEOC “in 
good faith” during pre-suit proceedings entitled the employer to 
summary judgment.
135
 Although Title VII requires that complainants 
                                                 
129
 Id. at 682. 
130
 Id.; EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 174 (7th Cir. 2013). 
131
 McCottrell v. EEOC, 726 F.2d 350, 351 (7th Cir. 1984). 
132
 Id. 
133
 Id. 
134
 Id. 
135
 Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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cooperate with investigations, the court refused to accept that the 
“good faith” cooperation was a prerequisite to suit or that alleged 
failure to cooperate could be an affirmative defense.
136
 The court 
refused to review the employee’s pre-suit activities, reasoning that 
Title VII provided no basis to review whether the employee 
cooperated in “good-faith.”137 The court added that reading a good-
faith requirement into the statute in the absence of express statutory 
language authorizing such a requirement would be “adventurous” and 
would “distress originalists.”138 The court also warned that, “[t]o allow 
employers to inject such an issue by way of defense in every Title VII 
case would cast a pall over litigation under that statute.”139   
In Mach, the EEOC cited the reasoning of Oberweis in its 
appellate brief, stating that the Seventh Circuit “could have been 
writing about review of conciliation when it offered its reasons for 
rejecting review of an employee’s pre−suit activities.”140 Just as there 
is no statutory basis for a “good faith” requirement regarding an 
employee’s cooperation with the EEOC, there is also no basis for a 
“good faith” requirement regarding the EEOC’s conciliation efforts.141 
The Oberweis court opined that any risk that employees will fail to 
cooperate with the EEOC, thereby “thwart[ing] the conciliation 
process and . . . thrust[ing] additional cases on the federal court is a 
slight one.”142 Similarly, refusal to subject conciliation to judicial 
scrutiny will not substantially thwart conciliation.
143
 As the Mach 
court noted, the EEOC is constrained by the “practical limitations of 
budget and personnel,” and thus “has its own powerful incentives to 
conciliate.”144   
The Seventh Circuit consistently refuses to permit judicial 
review of the EEOC’s statutorily-mandated processes when Title VII 
                                                 
136
 Id.  
137
 Id. at 711. 
138
 Id. 
139
 Id. 
140
 Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 14. 
141
 See EEOC v. Mach Mining LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 176–77 (7th Cir. 2013). 
142
 Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 710. 
143
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 180. 
144
 Id. 
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does not expressly authorize such review.
145
 Nevertheless, the Mach 
court does not rest solely upon statutory silence.
146
 On the contrary, 
the court argues that Title VII effectively prohibits such review.
147
 
More specifically, the court reasoned that Title VII’s requirement that 
the details of the conciliation process remain confidential in 
combination with its provision that the EEOC retain complete 
deference in the conciliation process, are contraindicative of judicial 
review.
148
  
 
C. Title VII’s Confidentiality Provision Contraindicates Judicial 
Review of Conciliation  
 
The Mach court reasoned that judicial review of the 
conciliation process conflicts directly with the confidentiality 
provision of Title VII.
149
 The court concluded that Title VII effectively 
prohibits judicial review of the conciliation process because it requires 
the details of conciliation to remain confidential.
150
 Title VII states 
“[n]othing said or done during and as a part of such informal 
endeavors may be made public by the Commission, its officers or 
employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without 
the written consent of the persons concerned.”151 In fact, violators of 
this strict confidentiality requirement may even be subject to criminal 
prosecution.
152
  
The Mach court reasoned that, because of this provision, a 
court would not have access to any of the relevant information 
necessary to evaluate any aspect of the process, and thus Title VII 
contraindicates judicial review.
153
 The court pointed out that Title VII 
contains no exception allowing information about conciliation to be 
                                                 
145
 See EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013). 
146
 Id. at 174. 
147
 Id. 
148
 Id. at 174–75. 
149
 Id.   
150
 Id. 
151
 42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(b). 
152
 42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(b). 
153
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d 174–75 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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admitted for collateral purposes, such as to satisfy a court that 
conciliation occurred or that the EEOC’s conciliation efforts were 
sufficient.
154
 Therefore, it would be impossible for courts to 
meaningfully evaluate any conciliation process because Title VII’s 
confidentiality requirement prohibits the court from accessing any 
information about the conciliation process.
155
 Essentially, the court 
would be required to evaluate conciliation without any evidence.
156
 
The court thus concluded that judicial review of the conciliation 
process directly contradicts Title VII’s confidentiality requirement.157 
In Mach, the district court resolved this contradiction by 
interpreting the statute as allowing information about the conciliation 
process to be introduced during litigation in certain, limited 
circumstances.
158
 The district court acknowledged that the statute 
prohibits the introduction of conciliation matters into evidence “to 
prove or disprove a claim on the merits,” but stated that the statute 
“does not prohibit the introduction of conciliation matters in collateral 
proceedings such as contesting the EEOC’s conciliation efforts.”159 
Essentially, the district court held that Title VII contains an implied 
exception to its confidentiality requirement, which allows for the 
information about the conciliation process to be introduced for non-
merit purposes in collateral hearings.
160
 The EEOC disagreed, stating 
in its appellate brief that, “even if the information is used in a non-
merits manner,” allowing such information to make its way into 
litigation “would risk a decrease in the open communication necessary 
to reach voluntary settlements during the conciliation process.”161 That 
is, compromising confidentiality would chill conciliation negotiations 
because participants would be concerned that their statements, 
                                                 
154
 Id. at 175.  
155
 Id. 
156
 Id. 
157
 Id. at 174–175. 
158
 EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11 CV 879 JPG PMF, 2013 WL 319337, 
at *2 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013), rev’d, 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013). 
159
 EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11 CV 879 JPG PMF, 2013 WL 
2177770, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Dec 20, 2013).  
160
 Id. 
161
 Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 9, 
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including settlement offers, would later be used against them during 
litigation.
162
 The EEOC further argued that, “[i]f Congress envisioned 
judicial review, it would make no sense to proscribe parties from 
disclosing conciliation information to the court.”163 The Seventh 
Circuit agreed with the EEOC, and reasoned that Title VII’s 
confidentiality requirement renders judicial review of the conciliation 
process impractical because a court would not have access to the 
information necessary to make a meaningful determination.
164
  
 
D. The EEOC’s Broad Discretion in Defining and Administering the 
Conciliation Process is Contraindicative to Judicial Review of 
Conciliation 
 
The Mach court also stressed that Title VII gives great 
deference to the EEOC regarding the conciliation process.
165
 While the 
statute requires the EEOC engage in conciliation efforts prior to filing 
a lawsuit, it essentially allows the EEOC to internally define and 
administer its conciliation efforts.
166
 The court stated “Title VII 
includes express statutory language making it clear that conciliation is 
an informal process entrusted solely to the EEOC’s expert judgment. 
167
 The court reasoned that such an “open-ended” grant of power to an 
administrative agency is not subject to judicial review.
168
  
Title VII uses general language that only requires that the 
EEOC “endeavor to eliminate” discriminatory practices through 
“informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”169 As 
the court noted, the statute does not further define the conciliation 
process, nor does it address “just how many offers, counteroffers, 
conferences, or phone calls” would be necessary to satisfy the 
                                                 
162
 Id. 
163
 Id. at 9. 
164
 EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 175 (7th Cir. 2013). 
165
 Id.   
166
 Id. 
167
 Id. at 174. 
168
 Id. at 175. 
169
 42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(b). 
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statute.
170
 Further, Title VII “says nothing about the informal methods 
the EEOC is required to use . . . or how hard the agency should 
‘endeavor’ to pursue them.”171 The statute also “gives no description 
of what a negotiated settlement should look like beyond eliminating 
the discriminatory conduct.”172 Furthermore, the court reasoned that 
the word “informal” indicates that Congress intended to maintain 
flexibility in the conciliation process and that the Commission would 
determine the substantive details of the process.
173
   
The court also stressed that Title VII gives the Commission 
complete discretion to accept or reject an employer’s offer for any 
reason.
174
  The EEOC can bring suit when it is “unable to secure from 
the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the 
Commission.”175 Thus, the EEOC is the sole arbiter of whether a 
proposed conciliation agreement is “acceptable.”176 Accordingly, even 
if the EEOC engaged in extensive conciliation efforts, and the 
employer complied throughout the process, the EEOC could still file 
suit if, for any reason at all, it was unsatisfied with outcome of the 
conciliation process.
177
 The Mach court characterized the statute as 
“an instruction to the EEOC to try, by whatever methods of persuasion 
it chooses short of litigation, to secure an agreement that the agency in 
its sole discretion finds acceptable.”178 Further, as the EEOC argued in 
its appellate brief, the statute’s command that the conciliation process 
be “informal,” indicates that the conciliation process is completely 
within the EEOC’s domain.179 The Mach court agreed, stating“[i]t 
would be difficult for Congress to have packed more deference to 
agency decision-making into so few lines of text.”180 The Mach 
                                                 
170
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 175.  
171
 Id. 
172
 Id.  
173
 Id. at 174.  
174
 Id. 
175
 Id. (emphasis added). 
176
 Id. 
177
 Id. at 176. 
178
 Id.  
179
 Brief of Appellant, supra note 86, at 10. 
180
 Mach, 738 F.3d at 174.  
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court’s reasoning is consistent with other Seventh Circuit cases that 
highlight the EEOC’s broad discretion and authority regarding pre-suit 
proceedings.
181
 
 
1. EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Association 
 
In EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Association, the EEOC sued a 
teachers union for damages related to a collective bargaining 
agreement that the Commission believed was discriminatory.
182
 Even 
though the school district voluntarily changed the objectionable 
portions of the agreement, the EEOC still filed suit, seeking 
damages.
183
 The union claimed the EEOC “lacked the right” to file 
suit because the union voluntarily complied with the requirements of 
Title VII during the conciliation process.
184
 The court rejected this 
argument, stating that the decision to file suit was within the sole 
discretion of the EEOC.
185
 
The court found that the EEOC had authority to file suit merely 
because “it failed to get all of what it wanted” during the conciliation 
process.
186
 Namely, the EEOC sought monetary relief, which the 
teachers association was unwilling to provide.
187
 In rendering its 
decision, the court noted that the EEOC’s decision to sue the teachers 
association was a “peculiar choice.”188 The court found the decision to 
be peculiar because, in addition to the fact that the teachers association 
had already changed the objectionable provisions of the collective 
bargaining agreement, success in litigation for monetary relief would 
“ensure that back pay would come from the teachers’ own pockets.”189 
Still, the court unambiguously stated that “[w]hether litigating to back 
                                                 
181
 See, e.g., EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Assoc., 27 F.3d 292, 293 (7th Cir. 1994); 
EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc. 409 F.3d 831, 832–33 (7th Cir. 2005). 
182
 Elgin Teachers Assoc.,27 F.3d at 293. 
183
 Id. 
184
 Id.at 294. 
185
 Id. 
186
 Id. . 
187
 Id. 
188
 Id. at 293–94.  
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up its demand was prudent is . . . a matter for the conscience of the 
person who authorized the suit, rather than for the judiciary.”190  
In Mach, the court cited its reasoning in Elgin Teachers 
Association, and stated that “the same reasoning applies to judicial 
review of conciliation efforts.”191 That is, the conciliation process is 
subject to judicial review because the entire process is within the sole 
discretion of the EEOC.
192
 Furthermore, the EEOC has full authority 
to file suit after conciliation, even when, as in Elgin Teachers 
Association, the employer voluntarily complies with Title VII.
193
 
Accordingly, the Mach court reasoned that it would be futile to probe 
into the adequacy of conciliation when the EEOC has full authority to 
reject even the most generous conciliation offers.
194
 Rather, the EEOC 
need only plead its compliance with Title VII in its complaint, and 
provide the employer with an opportunity make offers of voluntary 
compliance.
195
 
 
 
2. EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc. 
 
Similarly, in EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc., the Seventh Circuit 
held that the EEOC’s pre-suit investigation and reasonable cause 
determination regarding a discrimination charge were not judicially 
reviewable.
196
 In Caterpillar, a female employee filed a charge with 
the EEOC, claiming that she was fired for spurning her supervisor’s 
sexual advances.
197
 The EEOC sent a notice to the employer, stating 
that EEOC had “reasonable cause to believe that Caterpillar, the 
employer, discriminated against [the claimant] and a class of female 
                                                 
190
 Id. at 294. 
191
 EEOC v Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 181 (7th Cir. 2013). 
192
 Id. at 176 (“The parties here agree that . . . the EEOC is free to refuse an 
offer that might appear fair or even generous to a neutral observer.”). 
193
 Id. at 184 (“all parties acknowledge that the statute grants the EEOC 
discretion to reject any particular settlement offer . . . ”). 
194
 Id. at 175. 
195
 Id. at 184 
196
 EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc. 409 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2005). 
197
 Id. 831.  
27
DeLeon: Conference, Conciliation, and Persuasion: The Seventh Circuit's G
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 9, Issue 2                         Spring 2014 
 
397 
 
employees.”198 Caterpillar argued that the latter class-wide allegation 
was unrelated to the claimant’s original charge, and moved for 
summary judgment on the theory that the EEOC’s lawsuit went 
beyond the scope of the investigation required by Title VII.
199
 The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of summary judgment, holding that 
the “existence of probable cause to sue is generally and in this instance 
not judicially reviewable.”200  
The court reasoned that a nexus between the initial charge and 
an EEOC’s suit is only a concern when the suit is brought by a private 
party, not when the suit is brought by the EEOC itself.
201
 This is 
because, “if a private party were permitted to add claims that had not 
been presented in the administrative charge filed with the EEOC, the 
Commission’s informal procedures for resolving those charges 
. . . would be bypassed, in derogation of the statutory scheme.”202 That 
is, if the EEOC was unaware of certain allegations of discriminatory 
conduct, it could not investigate or conciliate those allegations before 
filing suit as required by Title VII. When the EEOC is the plaintiff, 
however, this is not a concern.
203
 As the court noted, if the EEOC’s 
“investigation turns up additional violations, the Commission can add 
them to its suit.”204 Therefore, when the suit is brought by the EEOC 
itself, “the suit is not confined to claims typified by those of the 
charging party.”205 
The court’s reasoning in Caterpillar reflected the 
Commission’s wide discretion and considerable authority when 
deciding whether to file suit against an employer. The Commission is 
free to determine the parameters of its investigation and to decide, 
based on that investigation, which claims to include in a complaint if it 
decides to file suit.
206
 Citing the reasoning in Caterpillar, the Mach 
                                                 
198
 Id. at 832 (emphasis added). 
199
 Id. 
200
 Id. at 833. 
201
 Id. at 832–33. 
202
 Id. 
203
 Id. at 833. 
204
 Id. at 832. 
205
 Id. at 833. 
206
 Id. at 832. 
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court stated “[n]othing in the language of Title VII or our past case 
law invites courts to review the agency’s finding of probable or 
reasonable cause, and the same is true of its approach to 
conciliation.”207 Conciliation, like the EEOC’s other pre-suit 
procedures, is within the discretion of the EEOC, and is thus not 
subject to judicial review.
208
 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit 
characterized the conciliation process as an opportunity for the 
employer to make offers of voluntarily compliance with EEOC 
standards, with the EEOC retaining complete discretion over whether 
such offers are sufficient to preclude litigation.
209
 This type of process, 
in which one party has absolute final authority, does not lend itself to 
judicial review.
210
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of Title VII’s conciliation requirement is not to 
create a hurdle that the EEOC must overcome before it can file an 
employment discrimination lawsuit.
211
 Rather, the requirement is best 
characterized as a procedural formality that gives the employer an 
opportunity to avoid litigation by voluntarily complying with Title 
VII’s requirements.212  Furthermore, allowing judicial review of the 
conciliation process would invite employers to “use the conciliation 
process to undermine enforcement of Title VII rather than to take the 
conciliation process seriously as an opportunity to resolve a 
dispute.”213 The court warned that “the potential gains of escaping 
liability altogether will, in some cases, more than make up for the risks 
of not engaging in serious attempts at conciliation.”214 Employers 
would thus be tempted to “turn what was meant to be an informal 
                                                 
207
 EEOC v Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 181 (7th Cir. 2013). 
208
 Id. 
209
 See id. at 176–79. 
210
 Id. at 175 (“Such an open-ended provision looks nothing like a judicially 
reviewable prerequisite to suit.”). 
211
 See id. at 180. 
212
 See id. at 176–79. 
213
 Id. at 178.  
214
 Id. at 179.  
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negotiation into the subject of endless disputes over whether the 
EEOC did enough before going to court.”215  
As the EEOC’s Appellate Attorney Eric Harrington stated, the 
Mach decision “permit[s] the district court to address the actual merits 
of this case, and enable the Commission to focus its efforts and 
resources on enforcing the laws against discrimination."
216
 Gregory 
Gochanour, the EEOC’s supervisory trial attorney for the Chicago 
District Office, echoed this sentiment, stating that the Mach decision 
“will compel all parties to focus on the issue of whether or not there 
actually was employment discrimination."
217
 Additionally, even 
without judicial review, the EEOC’s conciliation efforts are still 
subject to meaningful scrutiny because “Congress can exert its 
influence on the EEOC through oversight hearings, adjustments 
appropriations, and statutory amendments.”218 
Moreover, Title VII already provides an “all-purpose remedy” 
by which the EEOC’s alleged shortcomings may be addressed.219 
Namely, Title VII provides that, if an employee-complainant is 
dissatisfied with the EEOC’s progress regarding the employee’s 
charge of discrimination, the employee can “circumvent the EEOC 
procedures and seek relief through a private enforcement action in a 
district court.”220 This remedy does not include judicial review of the 
EEOC’s pre-suit procedural actions.221 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has 
explicitly refused to read any additional remedies into the statute, 
stating “we do not think Congress could have been more clear in 
expressing its intent that the private right of action . . . is an adequate 
remedy in a court for the alleged shortcomings in the EEOC’s 
                                                 
215
 Id. at 178–79.  
216
 EEOC, EEOC In Landmark Ruling, Seventh Circuit Holds Employers 
Cannot Challenge EEOC Conciliation, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/12-20-13b.cfm (Dec. 20, 2013).   
217
 Id.  
218
 Id. at 180.  
219
 Stewart v. EEOC, 611 F.2d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 1979). 
220
 Id. at 682 
221
 Id. at 683. 
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handling of the plaintiffs’ charges.”222 Therefore, Title VII already 
provides a means by which the EEOC’s alleged shortcomings may be 
remedied—namely, the private right of action conditioned upon a 180-
day waiting period.
223
 This is the sole remedy for addressing the 
EEOC’s shortcomings, and it does not include judicial review of 
conciliation.
224
 
Notably, while Title VII provides a remedy for employee-
complainants who are dissatisfied with the EEOC’s execution of its 
administrative procedures, it provides no such a remedy for employers 
who are dissatisfied with the same procedures.
225
 This omission 
indicates that Congress never intended an employer to have such a 
remedy.
226
 As the Supreme Court stated in Occidental Life, “the 
individual’s rights to redress are paramount under the provisions of 
Title VII [so] it is necessary that all avenues be left open for quick and 
effective relief.”227 The purpose of Title VII is to protect employees, 
not employers, especially when the EEOC has already investigated the 
employer and has found reasonable cause to believe that the employer 
is engaging in discriminatory employment practices.
228
 As the Mach 
court noted, “[t]here is no indication that Title VII’s directive to 
conciliate was for the special benefit of the employers or that they 
have a right to conciliation.”229 Rather, “Congress was focused on 
effective enforcement of the anti-discrimination standards of Title VII, 
not creating new rights for employers.”230 Simply put, judicial review 
                                                 
222
 Id. (quoting Hall v. EEOC, 456 F.Supp. 695, 701 (N.D.Cal.1978)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
223
 Id. 
224
 Id. 
225
 Id. at 682 (“[h]ad Congress intended a remedy of enforcement against the 
EEOC, the provisions of [Title VII] would have so indicated.”). 
226
 EEOC v Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 180 (7th Cir. 2013). 
227
 Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 366 (U.S. 1977) (quoting 
118 Cong. Rec. 1068-1069 (1972). 
228
 Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 180. 
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 Id. 
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of the conciliation process “does not fit well with the broader statutory 
scheme of Title VII.”231 
Moreover, the Mach court also noted that dismissal of a case 
on its merits would be “too final and drastic a remedy for any 
procedural deficiency in conciliation.”232 This reasoning is consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that the individual’s right 
to redress is “paramount” under Title VII.233 Title VII’s conciliation 
requirement was not meant to insulate employers from litigation. 
Rather, Title VII’s conciliation requirement provides another “avenue” 
by which an employee may obtain “quick and effective relief.”234As 
the EEOC’s General Counsel, David Lopez, stated in regards to the 
Mach decision, the Seventh Circuit "carefully applied the letter of the 
law . . . in a way that promotes Title VII’s goals, protects victims of 
discrimination, and preserves the EEOC’s critical law-enforcement 
prerogatives.”235 
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